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Unbundling operations, understood as the parent company’s disposal and sale of 
assets, facilities, product lines, subsidiaries, divisions and business units, are emerging as a 
central topic of research in several areas. Yet a synthesis is still lacking, and differences in 
the terminology have created confusion. This paper stimulates and facilitates future research 
by unpacking the nature of unbundling operations. We suggest that outcomes of unbundling 
may be mediated by variables, such as factors at process and management level, which have 
been greatly neglected in existing research. The paper builds a framework on antecedents, 
process and outcomes of unbundling by integrating empirical findings and theoretical 
contributions. Furthermore, it identifies gaps in the existing literature and offers suggestions 































Unbundling operations, understood as the parent company’s disposal and sale of 
assets, facilities, product lines, subsidiaries, divisions and business units, are emerging as a 
central topic in several fields of research, such as strategic management (Capron, Mitchell, & 
Swaminathan, 2001; Harrigan, 1981; Hopkins, 1991; McGahan & Villalonga, 2003a; Porter, 
1987; Singh, 1993), finance (Berry, 2003; Boudreaux, 1975; Rosenfeld, 1984; Schipper & 
Smith, 1986; Trifts, Sicherman, Roenfeldt, & de Cossio, 1990; Vijh, 2002) and 
organizational behavior (Aron, 1991; Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 1999; Bergh, 1995; 
Gopinath & Becker, 2000; Seward & Walsh, 1996). 
 
Previous empirical studies have focused mostly on stock market reactions to 
announcements of the unbundling operation and consequent variations in stock prices. As 
companies pursue objectives that go beyond the maximization of shareholders’ wealth, it is 
important to include also strategic and organizational reasoning and consequences in this area 
of study. Unbundling operations are more than just financing operations. They are means and 
not only ends, as they affect the long-term evolution of the firm. In this paper, we address 
unbundling mainly from the strategic management perspective. 
 
From a strategic perspective, it is still not clear whether unbundling is merely a 
reflection of the economic cycle (Aron, 1991; Duhaime & Grant, 1984; Garvin, 1983; Ito, 
1995), a means to correct or reverse previous strategic decisions (e.g. diversification) (Hitt, 
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994; Markides, 
1992a; Porter, 1987; Seth & Easterwood, 1993), or a proactive strategic option (McGahan & 
Villalonga, 2003b). 
 
Previous work in strategy has portrayed unbundling  as a reaction to an error of 
judgment by management at the time of the original acquisition (Porter, 1987), or as a 
readjustment of the company’s business focus in order to increase its economic value or 
competitive position. Following this line of thinking, divestitures have been described as the 
inverse of acquisitions (Hayes, 1972), the suggestion being that a firm will make up for an 
unsuccessful acquisition by simply “reversing” the purchase, i.e. disposing of the acquired 
business. More recent studies, however, suggest that mergers and acquisitions are not the 
inverse of divestitures, but strategic alternatives (McGahan et al., 2003b).  
 
Despite the increasing attention given to unbundling operations in both scholarly 
(Johnson, 1996; Markides, 1992a; Porter, 1987) and managerial journals (Dranikoff, Koller, 
& Schneider, 2002; Garvin, 1983), the question of whether unbundling operations are 
essentially corrective or proactive in nature remains unsettled (Eisenhardt & Brown, 1999). 
The literature on unbundling is still limited, compared to the large number of studies on 
mergers and acquisitions (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; Trautwein, 1990). This is 
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reflected in the variety of terms used to describe the phenomenon. Many authors use the 
terms divestiture and divestment as synonyms, and therefore fail to distinguish between 
the two phenomena. Mixing divestments and divestitures in the same database, for example, 
can bias the results of empirical studies. We believe that a more systematic approach is 
needed to understand the antecedents, the process, and the outcomes of unbundling 
operations. We review existing research, first, to evaluate the current state of knowledge on 
this topic, and second, to provide an integrative framework for exploring the relationship 
between antecedents, process and outcomes of unbundling. We do so by integrating empirical 
findings and theoretical contributions into a researchable whole. 
 
In this paper we argue that: i) failure to distinguish between divestments and 
divestitures has created and may still create confusion both at the level of theoretical 
constructs and at the level of empirical research; and ii) outcomes of unbundling may be 
mediated by variables neglected in current studies, such as factors at process and 
management level. These issues may explain why the debate between advocates and critics of 
unbundling is still open. In general, advocates of unbundling claim that unbundling results in 
a leaner and more efficient organization (Singh, 1993). Critics contend that it damages the 
company (Seth et al., 1993). 
 
This paper is organized as follows. First, we attempt to clarify definitional 
ambiguities on unbundling. We propose a hierarchical structure to classify definitions of 
unbundling, ranging from restructuring to the different unbundling modes. We also propose 
an analytical schema that organizes unbundling according to the reasons for the operation. 
Second, we offer a framework for categorizing research on unbundling. More specifically, 
within this framework we establish two broad categories of unbundling research: “theme 
oriented” studies and “linkage exploring” studies. In a next step we attempt to identify 
dominant patterns and gaps in current literature. In the conclusions, we suggest some areas 






As a review of the literature reveals, a variety of terms has been used to describe 
unbundling activities. While some authors use the broad term “unbundling” to describe more 
narrow concepts such as downscoping (Johnson, 1996), others make no distinction between 
divesting assets and divesting business units (Capron et al., 2001). 
 
In this section, we attempt to clarify the concept of unbundling and distinguish 
between unbundling modes. First, we differentiate between the broad concept of restructuring 
and unbundling.  Then, we explicitly distinguish between divestiture and divestment. We 
argue that a divestment (sale of corporate assets) differs from a divestiture (sale of a 
subsidiary or a business unit) in terms of economic, strategic and organizational antecedents, 





Modifications of the firm’s assets, capital structure or organizational structure fall 
into the general concept of restructuring (Bowman, Singh, Useem, & Bhadury, 1999; Singh, 
1993). Broadly speaking, restructuring refers to the transformation of corporate structure 
(Bowman & Singh, 1990), reconfiguration (Bowman & Singh, 1993), refocusing (Markides, 
1995), downscoping (Hitt, Hoskisson, Harrison, & Summers, 1994; Johnson, 1996), patching 
(Eisenhardt  et al., 1999; Siggelkow, 2002), or return to core competencies (Prahalad & 
Hamel, 1990). Restructuring involves changes in the mix of assets owned by a firm or the 
lines of business in which a firm operates (Bowman et al., 1999). Advocates of restructuring 3 
 
claim that the result of restructuring operations is a leaner and more efficient organization 
(Singh, 1993). Critics contend that restructuring damages the company and its stakeholders, 
including employees and shareholders (Seth et al., 1993). 
  
Typically, the decision to develop a new configuration of the corporation’s assets 
and/or lines of business involves the unbundling of peripheral corporate operations, through 
divestiture and divestment. Thus, unbundling operations are a vital part of corporations’ 





The terms divestiture and divestment are often used interchangeably to describe an 
unbundling operation. We argue that it is important to distinguish between the divestiture of 
business units and the divestment of physical assets in order to avoid confusion both at the 
level of theoretical constructs and at the level of empirical research. Failure to distinguish 
between these two phenomena can bias the results of empirical studies, for example. It is 
important that researchers triangulate data sources and compare database information with 
firms’ announcements in newspapers and other publications, to be sure to include in their 
sample only divestments or divestitures
2. 
 
Divestment: The term divestment often is used to refer without distinction to the 
sale of parts of a company, be it simply physical assets, or an entire business division, 
subsidiary, or product line. A more accurate definition describes divestment as the partial or 
complete sale or disposal of physical and organizational assets, shut-down of facilities, and 
workforce reduction (Capron et al., 2001). Nees (1978) sees divestment as a series of 
independent steps over time and across the various levels of the organization as a 
consequence of discontinuance of one of the firm’s activities. 
 
Divestiture: Divestiture refers to an alteration of the firm’s productive portfolio: a 
firm disposes of a division, a business unit, a product line or a subsidiary, offering it on the 
market (Rosenfeld, 1984). Hite and Owers (1983) add economic aspects to this definition: a 
divestiture entails the exchange of the productive or operative cash flows associated with the 
divested assets for cash, other operating assets, or securities of the acquired firm. 
 
The distinction between divestment and divestiture is important also because of a 
key structural aspect. With a divestiture –though not with a divestment– the parent creates a 
new company, which is able to operate more or less autonomously (Garvin, 1983). Although 
the divestment of assets is unquestionably an important  strategic choice (Lowe et al., 2005), 
the focus in this paper is on divestitures of business units, subsidiaries and product lines. 
 
 
Modes of divestiture 
 
Divestitures include sell-offs, spin-offs, spin-outs, carve-outs, split-offs, split-ups, 
leveraged buy-outs, and management buy-outs. In each of these divesting modes, the parent 
undergoes an unbundling operation for different reasons and in search of different objectives 
and therefore maintains a specific relationship with the divested unit. 
                                                            
2 Lowe and Veloso (2005) suggest another distinction to be made in the analysis of unbundling. They propose 
that assets and subsidiaries that were integrated in the parent through an acquisition are then divested for reasons 
unrelated to the firm’s strategy per se. Conversely, assets and subsidiaries which are the result of the parent’s 
investments are then divested for strategic reasons (Lowe et al., 2005). In this paper, we do not consider this 
subtle distinction in our definitions of divestment and divestiture. 
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A firm engages in a sell-off when it sells a division, business unit, product line or 
subsidiary to another firm in exchange for cash. The sold assets are absorbed by the acquiring 
firm and become part of it (Hearth & Zaima, 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984). In general, sell-off 
divisions are low-value assets and operate in industries different from the other parent 
industries (Powers, 2001). After the sell-off, the parent has no connection with the divested 
unit. 
 
In the other modes of divestiture, typically the parent identifies and pursues new 
opportunities and creates a new venture, which often retains connections with the parent 
company and operates as a semi-autonomous entity with little management support for risk 
taking and creativity (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
 
In the case of a spin-off, the detached division, business unit, product line or 
subsidiary becomes an independent company, whose shares are distributed to the parent’s 
stockholders: hence, the parent maintains control of the new company. A spin-off may truly 
be a method for the parent to reduce agency costs and create tax shields (John, 1993), or to 
enter a new industry (Garvin, 1983), while retaining a close relationship with the spun-off 
company. 
 
Spin-outs, also called entrepreneurial spin-offs, are entrepreneurial ventures founded 
by an employee of an incumbent firm leaving the parent. The spin-out is formed by 
individuals leaving an existing firm in the same industry and it often competes in the same 
industry as the parent (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2002; Dahlstrand, 1997).  
  
With a carve-out, a new independent company is created by detaching part of the 
parent’s businesses and selling the shares of the new company in a public offering. In 
general, the parent remains in possession of a substantial fraction of the equity of the carved-
out company. Allen (1998) emphasizes the fact that the parent undertakes a carve-out 
explicitly in order to raise funds in the capital market: these funds can be retained within the 
firm or used to pay creditors or shareholders. Carved-out divisions tend to be high-value 
assets (Powers, 2001). Carve-outs are seen as temporary forms of restructuring and often, 
after some time, the parent reacquires the carved-out division or divests it into another mode 
(Klein, Rosenfeld, & Beranek, 1991; Slovin, Sushka, & Ferraro, 1995). 
 
With a split-off, the parent’s shareholders receive stocks of the new company in 
exchange for parent company stocks. A split-up occurs when the parent ceases to exist and 
the divested unit remains in the market. 
 
A leveraged buy-out (LBO) is a transaction in which a group of private investors 
uses debt financing to purchase a corporation or a corporate division. The principal 
characteristics of a LBO are high leverage, management ownership, active corporate 
governance, and investors’ loss of access to liquid public equity markets (Palepu, 1990). 
 
Management buy-outs (MBOs) are transactions in which managers, with the support 
of other investors, replace public stockholding of the parent company. MBOs are normally 
financed with large debt issues, and the new stocks are normally held by incumbent managers 
and a small group of external investors. MBOs often continue to operate significant portions 




Logics of unbundling operations 
 
Companies follow a logic when they engage in an unbundling operation. We believe 
it is important to recognize the different reasons for which a company decides to divest. Here, 
we propose an analytical schema which groups unbundling actions according to the logic for 5 
 
unbundling. In this categorization, unbundling operations are motivated either by legal, 
market or strategy logics. 
 
Montgomery et al. (1984) propose a segmentation with five types of unbundling: 
undiscussed divestitures, strategic divestitures, sales of undesired units, forced divestitures, 
and sales in response to liquidity concerns. This subjective categorization tries to link 
corporate strategy and financial valuation. We believe, however, that it fails to account for 
some of the reasons behind unbundling operations. We propose a new segmentation of 
unbundling, which we believe to be more complete. We ascribe unbundling to three different 
origins: legal, market and strategy origins. 
 
1.  From a legal perspective, divestitures can be categorized as either voluntary 
or involuntary (Montgomery, Thomas, & Kamath, 1984). A company may 
voluntarily decide to divest part of its business for strategic, financial or 
organizational reasons. An involuntary divestiture, by contrast, is normally a 
reaction to legal and/or regulatory difficulties (Hite & Owers, 1983; 
Montgomery et al., 1984; Vijh, 2002). Boudreaux (1975) and Montgomery et 
al. (1984) find that, while voluntary divestiture announcements are 
surrounded by positive price movements, the opposite applies to involuntary 
divestitures. Most earlier research did not really make a distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary unbundling decisions. More recently, though, 
strategy researchers have focused mainly on voluntary divestitures. These are 
strategic moves willingly made by companies. 
 
2.  The  strategic perspective suggests that firms decide to divest for either 
corrective or proactive reasons. Corrective divestitures are intended to make 
up for previous strategic mistakes (Hitt et al., 1996; Porter, 1987), to reduce 
over-diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Markides, 1992a), to refocus on 
core businesses (Markides, 1992a; Seth et al., 1993), to realign corporate 
strategy with the firm’s identity (Mitchell, 1994; Zuckerman, 2000), to react 
to an increase in industry-level competition (Aron, 1991), to eliminate 
negative synergies (Linn & Rozeff, 1985; Miles & Rosenfeld, 1983; 
Rosenfeld, 1984), or to resolve organizational issues such as bad governance 
(Hoskisson et al., 1994). The purpose of proactive divestitures is to 
restructure the company’s asset portfolio (Bowman et al., 1999; Hitt et al., 
1996) by routinely redesigning, splitting, transferring, or exiting businesses to 
adapt to changing market opportunities (Eisenhardt et al., 1999; Siggelkow, 
2002). This reconfiguration process is aimed at designing a more efficient 
governance form (Seward et al., 1996), improving performance and 
profitability (Fluck & Lynch, 1999; Haynes, Thompson, & Wright, 2002; 
Mitchell, 1994; Woo, Willard, & Daellenbach, 1992), obtaining new cash 
flows (Hitt et al., 1996; Jensen, 1989), reducing high levels of debt (Allen & 
McConnell, 1998; Hitt et al., 1996; Montgomery et al., 1984) or tax payments 
(John, 1993; Schipper et al., 1986; Vijh, 2002), getting better contracts from 
regulators (Schipper et al., 1986; Woo et al., 1992), or improving corporate 
innovativeness and entrepreneurship (Cassiman & Ueda, 2004; Garvin, 
1983). 
 
3.  At market level, we propose a distinction between defensive and aggressive 
reasons. Hopkins (1991) tests the “defensive response” explanation of the link 
between acquisition and divestiture. He claims that acquisitions can be a 
defensive reaction to weak or deteriorating industry conditions and 
competitive position, and that the attractiveness and concentration of the 
firm’s home industry are positively related to unbundling decisions. Duhaime 
and Baird (1987) find that the reasons behind divesting decisions are 
aggressive for medium-sized units and defensive for small and large units. As 6 
 
far as the attitude of the buyer and seller is concerned, it seems that the parent 
gets slightly lower total returns from transactions where there are aggressive 
buyers and/or sellers (Bowman et al., 1999). 
 
Most divestitures can be predicted correctly on the basis of an analysis of the 




Are we dealing with different phenomena? 
 
Each of these analytical perspectives is not focalized and limited to just one specific 
aspect of the unbundling phenomenon. These categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
In some cases it is not easy to determine whether an unbundling operation is a 
corrective or a proactive decision. For example, an involuntary divestiture can also be 
considered a corrective strategic action, to adjust the corporate strategy to existing legal 
constraints. Similarly, a defensive approach to market conditions can be interpreted as a 
correction of an obsolete or misaligned strategy. A proactive strategy may have no aggressive 
intentions or consequences, as in the case of the first mover, who decides to divest. 
Divestitures may be simultaneously an adaptation to regulatory and legal constraints, a 
reaction to environmental changes and variations in industry level, and a strategy to obtain 
and retain competitive advantage. 
 
In all cases, it is important that researchers take into considerations the different 
logics behind unbundling operations. Mostly, it is important to distinguish between voluntary 
–for strategic or market reasons– and involuntary –for legal and/or regulatory constraints– 
operations when analyzing unbundling. The logics are different and therefore the outcomes 




A FRAMEWORK FOR CATEGORIZING RESEARCH ON UNBUNDLING 
 
Overview of the model 
 
We propose a framework to help classify and integrate current literature on 
divestiture. We group existing research into three streams: antecedents, decision and process 
management, and outcome. The diagram presented in Figure 2, adapted from Johnson (1996), 


















Figure 2. Classificatory framework: content of antecedents, process and outcome categories 
 




























Figure 2 consists of 10 boxes that represent central concepts in research on 
unbundling. It includes antecedents (boxes 1 to 4 in the diagram: General Environment, 
Industry Characteristics, Corporate Characteristics, and Business-unit Characteristics), 
outcomes (boxes 8 to 10 in the diagram: Economic, Strategic, and Organization/Governance), 
and process (boxes 5 to 7 in the diagram: Choice of Mode, Management of Unbundling, 
Governance Structure and Management Team). 
 
Within this framework, we distinguish between two types of studies on unbundling. 
The first set contains studies that fit a specific box. In general, these studies describe the 
relevant phenomenon and are “theme oriented”. We examine each box of the three streams, 
in turn, as presented in Figure 2. The second set consists of studies that explore the linkages 
between boxes. These studies explore relationships between variables or concepts. 
 
 
“Theme oriented” studies 
 
“Theme oriented” studies focus on the content of one specific box. They investigate the 
factors that lead to unbundling, the process of unbundling, and the outcomes once the decision to 
divest has been taken. For example, we include in this category Khoroishilov’s general 
equilibrium model (Khoroshilov, 2002) and Hoskisson’s set of antecedents to unbundling 
intensity (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Khoroishilov’s conceptual model (2002) analyzes whether the 
decision to diversify and divest depends on external shocks. Hoskisson (1994) proposes and tests 
a theoretical model of corporate unbundling intensity, which depends on antecedents of the 







































Table 1. Box content studies 
 
  Illustrative studies 
Box Theme  Conceptual  Empirical 
1  General  environment  (Garvin, 1983; Ito, 1995; 
Khoroshilov, 2002) 
(Campa et al., 2002; Duhaime et 
al., 1984; Eisenhardt et al., 1999; 
Rose et al., 2005) 
2  Industry  characteristics  (Garvin, 1983; Ito, 1995; 
Porter, 1987) 
(Campa et al., 2002; Harrigan, 
1981; Hopkins, 1991; Markides, 
1992b; Rose et al., 2005) 
3 Corporate  characteristics  (Fluck  et al., 1999; Ito, 1995; 
Khoroshilov, 2002; Markides, 
1997; McGahan et al., 2003a; 
Porter, 1987; Reuer & Shen, 
2003; Singh,  1993; 
Zuckerman, 2000) 
(Bergh, 1995, 1997; Berry, 2003; 
Bethel et al., 1993; Campa et al., 
2002; Capron et al., 2001; Chang, 
1996; Dahlstrand, 1997; Duhaime 
et al., 1984; Harrigan, 1981; 
Haynes et al., 2003; Hitt et al., 
1996; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Ito 
et al., 1994; Kaplan, 1991; Karim 
& Mitchell, 2000; Markides, 
1992b; Mitchell, 1994; Prahalad et 
al., 1990; Reuer et al., 2003; 
Wright et al., 1997; Zuckerman, 
2000) 
4 B-unit  characteristics  (Fluck et al.,  1999)  (Chang, 1996; Duhaime et al., 
1987; Duhaime et al., 1984; Ito et 
al., 1994; Lowe et al., 2005; 
Zuckerman, 2000) 
6  Management of unbundling  (Nees, 1978)  (Reuer et al., 2003, 2004) 
7  Governance structure and 
management team 
(Aron, 1991; Johnson et al., 
1993; Nees, 1981) 
(Bowman et al., 1999; Gopinath et 
al., 2000) 
8 Economic  outcome  (Cassiman et al., 2004; Colak 
et al., 2004; Fluck et al., 1999) 
(Alexander et al., 1984; 
Boudreaux, 1975; Bowman et al., 
2001; Bowman et al., 1993; Colak 
et al., 2004; Denning et al., 1990; 
Haynes et al., 2002; Hearth et al., 
1984; Hite et al., 1983; 
Khoroshilov, 2002; Klein, 1986; 
Klein et al., 1991; Linn et al., 
1985; Makhija, 2004; Markides, 
1992a; McGahan et al., 2003a; 
Miles et al., 1983; Montgomery et 
al., 1984; Rosenfeld, 1984; Slovin 
et al., 1995) 




(Baker et al., 1999)   (Bowman et al., 1999; Bruining et 
al., 2002; Gopinath et al., 2000; 
Kaplan, 1991; Seth et al., 1993; 






In this section, we pinpoint the main factors presented in the literature as antecedents 





General environment (box 1) 
 
Despite the difficulties of empirical testing (Duhaime et al., 1984), the debate about 
whether and how  economic conditions or the environment affect unbundling operations 
continues.  While this debate is still open, a number of researchers have contended that 
unbundling can be a reaction to shocks in the environment (Campa & Kedia, 2002; Garvin, 
1983; Ito, 1995; Rose & Ito, 2005).  Khoroshilov (2002) finds that divestitures tend to occur 
during economic “booms”, whereas Campa et al. (2002) claim the opposite. Divestitures 
seem more likely to occur in rapidly changing markets and highly competitive environments 
(Eisenhardt  et al., 1999; Ito, 1995). Ito (1995) and Garvin (1983) suggest that specific 
cultural and social contexts (homogeneous society, informal contracts, stable shareholders, 




Industry characteristics (box 2) 
 
Various authors  have emphasized the importance of a systematic analysis of 
industry attractiveness and the parent’s competitive position for unbundling strategies 
(Garvin, 1983; Harrigan, 1981; Hopkins, 1991; Porter, 1987). In emerging industries, both 
new firms and established companies may be willing to encourage spin-offs (Garvin, 1983). 
In established industries, companies that do not yet operate in the industry are better able to 
identify niches and opportunities: spin-offs are the easiest mode of entry in the industry 
(Garvin, 1983).  
 
Variables to explain unbundling operations at industry level include industry 
profitability (Markides, 1992b), industry concentration (Hopkins, 1991; Markides, 1992b), 
industry attractiveness to conglomerates (Campa et al., 2002), industry merger and 
acquisition intensity (Campa et al., 2002), industry advertising intensity (Markides, 1992b), 
industry R&D intensity (Markides, 1992b), industry size (Markides, 1992b), and parent’s 
market share in the industry (Markides, 1992b). 
 
Conversely, unbundling is deterred by other factors, such as economic exit barriers 
and differentiable and commodity-like product traits (Harrigan, 1981). 
 
Evidence shows that there exist divesting patterns specifically in immature 
industries, mostly characterized by the presence of multiple market segments, information 
and start-up advantages, and transferable technologies, such as the construction, Hi-tech, and 
consulting industries (Garvin, 1983).  
 
 
Corporate characteristics (box 3) 
 
A number of researchers have emphasized the characteristics of companies 
undertaking an unbundling operation. In general, firms engaging in a voluntary divestiture 
are different from those that decide not to engage in a divestiture. Hence, we can expect them 
to have specific corporate characteristics. 
 
From a strategic perspective, most divesting companies seem to be more diversified 
than their industry counterparts (Haynes, Thompson, & Wright, 2003; Hoskisson et al., 
1994). Exaggerated diversification pushes a company toward de-diversification and de-
conglomeration as a correction of its strategic choices. However, in very specific contexts, 
divestitures are also used to enhance diversification, e.g. spin-offs in Japan (Ito, 1995). 
Diversification decreases innovativeness and entrepreneurial spirit within firms. Highly 
diversified companies tend to emphasize financial controls, to de-emphasize strategic 
controls and thereby produce less internal innovation (Hitt et al., 1996), and to increase 10 
 
managerial risk aversion (Hoskisson et al., 1994). Therefore, a company may engage in 
unbundling operations to improve its innovation capacity and its entrepreneurial spirit, or to 
enter technology-based and immature industries (Garvin, 1983). Spin-offs, for example, can 
be used to stimulate corporate innovativeness and entrepreneurial spirit in the divested unit, 
while the parent earns some benefits from the new product or technology developed in the 
independent company (Garvin, 1983). 
 
Restructuring a firm from a financial standpoint means changing its capital 
structure, returning to shareholders cash owned by managers and redistributing the weights of 
equity and debt (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). Current research has not reached a consensus 
about the effect of the parent’s financial status on its decision to divest parts of its businesses. 
One line of research, led by Porter (1987), argues that divesting firms in the 1970s were 
generally poor performers (Duhaime & Baird, 1987; Haynes et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 
1994; Zuckerman, 2000) and relatively indebted companies (Haynes et al., 2003; Hoskisson 
et al., 1994). More recent research has investigated the relationship between divestiture and 
conglomerate discount (Colak & Whited, 2004; Khoroshilov, 2002). Khoroshilov (2002) 
shows that companies traded at a diversification discount are more likely to refocus and 
hence to divest. Campa and Kedia (2002) find that firms with high historical average 
investments and low recent investments, with high historical average profitability and high 
recent profitability, and with high historical average value of assets are more likely to 
refocus. In contrast, for other researchers divestitures appear not to be significantly 
determined by the firm’s performance (Berry, 2003; Singh, 1993).  
 
Agency theorists believe that firms decide to engage in an unbundling operation 
because of issues at governance level (Hoskisson et al., 1994; Markides, 1997). The reasons 
why many companies undertook restructuring operations in the 1980s had to do with issues 
between managers, owners and the board of directors. Weak governance, defined as the 
quality of the monitoring of strategy and performance in a firm, generally leads to high 
product diversification, weak strategy formulation, and consequently to poor performance 
(Haynes et al., 2003; Hoskisson et al., 1994).  Changes in ownership (Bethel et al., 1993), 
high levels of ownership concentration such as blockholders or institutional investors, and 
changes in top management (Haynes et al., 2003) are frequent antecedents of unbundling 
operations (Bethel et al., 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994). Problems at corporate control level 
and the consequent need to improve internal controls may lead to a reduction of 




Business unit characteristics (box 4) 
 
The division’s performance and financial status (Duhaime et al., 1984; Zuckerman, 
2000), relative size (Duhaime et al., 1987), and relatedness to the focal firm (Chang, 1996; 
Duhaime et al., 1984) are the most frequently mentioned characteristics of business units to 
explain unbundling operations. 
 
An asset or a segment is less likely to be divested when it is generally strong, more 
profitable and when its prospects of future earnings are greater (Duhaime et al., 1987; 
Duhaime et al., 1984; Lowe et al., 2005; Zuckerman, 2000). However, Fluck (1999) argues 
that an acquired subsidiary is divested only when it becomes sufficiently profitable. 
 
There is general agreement about the relationship between unit size and divestiture 
decisions
3. Defensive reasons are given for the divestiture of small and large units, while 
aggressive reasons are given for medium-sized units (Duhaime et al., 1987). Duhaime (1987) 
                                                            
3 Only Trifts et al. (1990) find that size is not important for management buy-outs. 11 
 
finds that there is a curvilinear relationship between unit size
4 and divestiture. There seem to 
be minimum efficient sizes for units in the business portfolios of diversified firms, sizes 
below which business units should not be acquired. 
 
In contrast, unit relatedness, generally referred to as existing interdependencies 






In this section, we describe process factors affecting unbundling operations, as 
presented in current literature. Here, we refer these factors back only to the Management of 
Unbundling box and the Governance structure, management team and effects on employees 
box. We will discuss Choice of Mode later in the paper. 
 
 
Management of unbundling (box 6) 
 
The board of directors initiates an unbundling operation if the performance of the 
company is declining. Otherwise, the unbundling operation is more likely to be initiated by 
managers (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). 
 
In both cases, the division manager assumes a central role. His collaboration is 
essential for the success of the divestiture, as he is the information supplier, implementer of 
secondary decisions, protector of morale and productivity in the divested division, host of 
potential acquirers when visiting the division, and finally a potential buyer (Nees, 1981). 
However, external investors may negatively perceive the role of management in unbundling 
operations, as in the case of a management buy-out. A divestiture to unit managers raises the 
issue of asymmetric information and conflict of interests. External investors may believe that 
unit managers are pursuing their specific interests (Nees, 1981; Trifts et al., 1990) and that 
the divestiture may require specialized information not available to the division manager 
(Nees, 1981). On the other hand, managers often know more about a firm’s investment 
opportunities than external investors do (Nees, 1981). 
  
 
Governance structure, management team and effects on employees (box 7) 
 
Both the governance structure and the role of managers affect the process and 
outcome of a divestiture, as does the reaction of employees. Board members, and specifically 
outside directors, will be involved in an unbundling operation only when managerial strategic 
controls are perceived to be weak and when the top management team is heterogeneous 
(Johnson et al., 1993). Middle managers’ active participation in the divesting process is 
essential for the success of the divestiture (Nees, 1981). Also, divestitures can be used to 
improve the effectiveness of corporate incentives. After a divestiture, the stock value of the 
product line is a much cleaner signal of managerial productivity, as there is no more noise 
from the rest of the multidivisional company (Aron, 1991). 
 
Divestitures are often accompanied by changes in the organizational structure, such 
as divisional redesign and employment downsizing (Bowman et al., 1999). If layoffs are 
understood by employees as necessary for corporate survival, they are perceived as just. But 
when layoffs merely stem from corporate unbundling, employees tend to perceive them as 
                                                            
4 Unit size is here measured as the unit annual sales as a percent of the total firm annual sales (Duhaime et al., 
1987). 12 
 
unnecessary and unjust. This may cause a sense of frustration and mistrust toward the parent 
company. Line management’s cooperation (Nees, 1981) and straightforward managerial 
communication (Gopinath et al., 2000) seem to positively influence employees’ perceptions 
of procedural justice of layoffs, build post-divestiture trust in the organization, and influence 





The literature is increasingly studying the effect of unbundling on shareholders’ 
wealth, corporate strategy and corporate governance. In this section we try to understand 
whether the parent and/or the divested unit actually benefit from unbundling. 
 
 
Economic outcome (box 8) 
 
An increasing body of finance and strategic management literature studies the effect 
of unbundling on shareholders’ wealth. The objective is to examine whether divestitures are 
value creating or value destroying, for both the parent and the divested unit. The literature 
has focused mainly on the market or book value effect of divestitures. 
 
There is a general consensus about the  positive effect that unbundling 
announcements have on the divesting firm’s stock price on the announcement date. 
Substantial and significant strong positive share price variations are normally found on the 
announcement dates (Boudreaux, 1975; Haynes et al., 2002; Hearth et al., 1984; Markides, 
1992a), sometimes also before (Boudreaux, 1975; Haynes et al., 2002; Hearth et al., 1984; 
Markides, 1992a; Montgomery et al., 1984) and after it (Boudreaux, 1975; Hearth et al., 
1984; Montgomery et al., 1984). The most common explanation for such positive results is 
the decrease of diversification of the parent (John & Ofek, 1995). Empirical evidence seems 
to indicate that divestitures may increase firm value for several reasons, such as a wealth 
redistribution between the parent’s shareholders and bondholders (Denning & Shastri, 1990; 
Hite et al., 1983; Linn et al., 1985; Miles et al., 1983; Palepu, 1990); a  supposed information 
dissemination prior to public announcement (Linn et al., 1985); or efficiency-related gains. 
Positive returns seem to depend specifically on three factors, i.e. on the type of unbundling, 
on the process of unbundling, and on the characteristics of the business unit. First, financial 
restructuring shows the strongest positive returns (Bowman & Helfat, 2001). Second, aspects 
of process management affecting the economic outcome include the way the divestiture is 
announced (Klein, 1986), and the capacity of managers to communicate to claimholders the 
improved profitability of the new project prior to the divestiture announcement (Fluck et al., 
1999). Third, the characteristics of the business unit affecting the return of unbundling are 
absolute size (larger divestitures show larger positive excess returns)  (Hearth et al., 1984; 
Klein, 1986; Miles et al., 1983),  size relative to the rest of the company (Hite et al., 1983; 
Miles et al., 1983), relatedness to the rest of the company (John et al., 1995), presence in the 
same industry (Rose et al., 2005), and the existence of long-term managerial incentive 
contracts (Tehranian, Travlos, & Waegelein, 1987). 
 
On the other hand, some authors claim that unbundling has neutral or negative 
market outcomes. Woo et al. (1992) find no significant improvement in the pre- and post-
divestiture performance of the divested unit, except for a slight decrease in return on assets in 
the post-spin-off performance of the divested unit. For negative reactions at market level two 
main explanations are proposed. The first concerns the information conveyed with the 
unbundling announcement and its credibility. The announcement may lack credibility if the 
company has not preceded the announcement with preparatory organizational changes, if 
unbundling is expected to have no impact on the firm’s future, and if investors already 
expected this operation and the information was already reflected in the firm’s stock price 
(Bowman et al., 1993). The second explanation concerns the willingness of the company to 13 
 
divest part of its business. Involuntary (i.e. forced by legislative or judicial reasons) 
unbundling announcements are surrounded by negative parent stock price movement 
(Boudreaux, 1975; Hearth et al., 1984; Hite et al., 1983). 
 
 
Strategic outcome (box 9) 
 
Corporate unbundling aims at more than a boost-up of the company’s stock price. 
An essential goal of unbundling operations is to change and improve a firm’s strategy. 
Divestitures are a natural evolution in business practice (Nees, 1978). They are a tool of 
business strategy. They can be vehicles for focusing the firm’s strategic activities toward the 
most closely related businesses (Seth et al., 1993). Nees (1978) gives managers some 
practical suggestions to maximize the strategic outcome of unbundling, such as to establish 
business policy committees, to formulate a zero-base strategy, and to establish a “divisions 
exchange market”. 
 
The intra-organizational relationship between the parent and its subsidiaries generates 
different types of spin-offs. An intense relationship between parent and divested unit is 
beneficial up to a limit, beyond which over-embeddedness starts (Parhankangas & Arenius, 
2003). In this case, divestitures can be used to renew the parent firm’s competencies. For 
example, spin-offs to develop new technologies and restructuring spin-offs operate in very 
different knowledge environments from their parent firms (Parhankangas et al., 2003). In 
general, a parent operating in R&D intensive industries can use unbundling operations to 
implement strategic controls to foster internal innovation (Hitt et al., 1996) and to increase 
managerial risk-taking through new investments in R&D (Hoskisson & Johnson, 1992). 
 
Divested units benefit  from unbundling because of a decrease in size (Bruining & 
Wright, 2002), reduced agency costs and increased flexibility (Seth et al., 1993), the 
possibility for the divested unit to negotiate a more favorable set of contracts with the 
regulators (Schipper et al., 1986), and reduced corporate taxes (Seth et al., 1993). 
 
 
Organization and governance (box 10) 
 
Divestitures facilitate shaping the characteristics of the organization, such as the new 
ownership,  and the implementation of efficient internal governance and control practices 
(Jensen, 1983; Seward et al., 1996). Managers select the best governance form given the 
characteristics of the firm, of the target partner and the relationships between the underlying 
activities involved in restructuring (McGahan et al., 2003a). Firms specify their governance 
preferences as part of their corporate strategies for contracting and expanding their 
boundaries. Divestitures are substitute governance forms for contracting firm boundaries 
(McGahan et al., 2003a). Equity reorganizations also seem to facilitate the implementation of 
efficient internal governance and control practices, such as the selection of the new CEO, and 
of new compensation contracts for managers (Seward et al., 1996).   Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy (1999) argue that formal ownership structures affect the feasibility of informal 
relational contracts. Informal delegation within an organization differs from formal 
delegation via divestiture; and divestiture, through asset transfer, achieves the delegation of 
formal authority. Asset ownership affects reneging temptations: the allocation of formal 
authority can influence whether a particular allocation of informal authority can be achieved 
in the medium to long term. Divestiture is efficient in circumstances where contractable 
delegation would be valuable but informal delegation is not feasible (Baker et al., 1999). 
 
Agency theory suggests that, in the post-divestiture period, the new ownership and 
capital structure can affect the motivations of the firm’s key stakeholder groups and their 
objectives (Gopinath et al., 2000; Palepu, 1990). Advantages for the divested subsidiary 
include a shorter distance between policy and implementation, a decrease in size and 14 
 
complexity of the organizational structure, and easier delegation, action and consensus 
between managers and owners (Bruining et al., 2002; Seth et al., 1993). This all allows a 
more flexible decision making process and stimulates efficiency. 
 
 
Comments on “theme oriented” studies 
 
From Table 1 it is easy to identify the variables that have received most attention in 
research on unbundling. Within Antecedents, it is the Corporate Characteristics category. 
Possibly this is because divestitures are often perceived as dependent on the firm’s specific 
characteristics, rather than on external variables such as the general environment or the 
industry. Within the Outcome category, Economic Outcome receives the greatest attention. 
This may be explained by two reasons. First, divesting managers are more concerned with 
their company’s short-term economic performance. This implies that economic-results based 
analyses have a broader audience.  Second, this type of analyses –mostly on ex post 





Studies in the “linkage exploring” category focus on contingency-type relationships 
between several variables. This type of study analyzes the connection between two or more 
variables in the three streams: Antecedents, Process and Outcome. Within this category, we tried 
to identify as many linkages between variables or concepts as have been explored in empirical 
studies. The “linkage exploring” studies category includes, for example, Trift’s (1990) analysis 
on the impact on economic performance from selling to unit managers. Variables at Antecedents, 
Process and Outcome level, such as asymmetric information, increased job security and reduced 
agency and servicing costs, affect parent-firm shareholder wealth (Trifts et al., 1990). “Linkage 
exploring” studies are presented in three different tables. Table 2 presents empirical studies, 
going beyond the post-unbundling economic outcome. In Table 3 we use the same criterion, but 
for conceptual studies. Table 4 presents papers with economic performance as dependent 
variable, which are typically published in finance journals. These categorizations immediately 
show which links have been most explored. It is easy to identify gaps in the current literature. 
Some links have never been discussed in any paper. 
 




Link Key  ideas/findings 
(Bergh, 1995; Duhaime 
et al., 1987) 
4 to 9  - Curvilinear relationship between unit size and reason for divestment. 
Defensive reasons are given for divestment of small and large units, 
while aggressive reasons are given for medium-sized units. 
- Ownership concentration is positively associated with the sale of 
unrelated and small units. 
- There may exist minimum efficient sizes for units in the business 
portfolios of diversified firms, sizes below which BU should not be 
acquired. 
- Moderate-sized units are divested as part of a strategic reorientation of 
the  company despite their relatedness to other units. 
(Bergh, 1995; Duhaime 
et al., 1987) 
4 to 8  - Returns on small units had to be abnormally high for top managers to 
stay interested. 
- Debt/equity ratio, dividend policy and stock price are perceived as 
exerting greater influence on decisions to divest larger units than 
medium units than small units. Most firms had lower ROE than 
industry average when divestment decisions were made. 
- Post-sell-off performance of the parent is associated negatively with 




Parhankangas et al., 
2003) 
3 to 9  - ESOs have a higher degree of technology transfer. 
- Founder’s ideas were not utilized by parent company. 
- Primary source of gains from LBOs is organizational changes that lead 
to improvements in the company’s operating and investment 
decisions, by providing to managers and their monitors superior 
incentives, derived from increased management ownership and high 
financial leverage. 
- Management equity ownership ensures that managers do not meet debt 
payments through short-term cash flow improvements at the expense 
of long-term value. 
- Presence and participation of external equity investors in governance 
lead to improved monitoring of managers’ performance.  
- Study identifies 3 clusters of spin-offs, according to the collaboration 
between the parent and the spin-off, and the dependence of the spin-
off from the resources provided by parent: spin-offs developing new 
technologies, spin-offs serving new markets, restructuring spin-offs. 
(McGahan et al., 2003b)  3 to 10  - Firms tend to choose integrative forms of governance (acquisitions) 
when: 
- There is a high degree of uncertainty and asset specificity but low 
internal organization costs associated with the transactions. 
- Either the focal or the target firm is advertising-intensive but not R&D 
intensive. 
- The focal and target firm are in related businesses, have dissimilar 
levels of R&D expenditures and are balanced in size. 
- The business subject to transaction is also related to the focal firm’s 
main business. 
- The focal firm is diversified and has prior acquisition experience but 
little alliance experience. 
(Gopinath et al., 2000)  6&7 to 
10 
- Employee perceptions of procedural justice regarding the divestiture 
cause trust and later post-divestiture commitment to the organization, 
and affect trust and commitment more into the new company. 
- Managerial communications during divestiture process increase 
perceptions of procedural justice of divestiture and layoffs. 
(Duhaime et al., 1987)  4 to 
6&7 
- Managers of smaller units generally have greater involvement in the 
decision process. 
- With larger units, divestment decisions are less influenced by 
reluctance to spend the management time required to solve the unit’s 
problems, than by the effects that not divesting will have on the firm’s 
image and financial position. 
 




Link Key  ideas/findings 
(Aron, 1991)  10 to 3  - The possibility of a future spin-off improves current incentives for 
divisional managers, even if the spin-off rarely actually occurs.  
- New investment in spin-offs in the period immediately after spin-off 
will be higher than before spin-off and higher than in firms with 
similar characteristics but which didn’t spin-off. 
- Improved managerial incentives created by stock-based compensation 
after spin-off lead to higher firm value. 
(John, 1993; Singh, 
1993) 
3 to 9, 
6 to 8 
- Any incremental value of spin-off results from the combined effect of 
changes in agency costs and tax shields. 
- Coinsurance effect on investment incentives dominates the effect of a 
flexible allocation of debt across technologies in a spin-off. 
- The larger differences in R&D expenditures and intangible assets within 
high technology industries, the more likely are spin-offs to occur. 
- Divestitures appear to be more than just a phenomenon associated 
with poorly-performing businesses of the firm.  
- Loss of morale and high levels of turnover have been identified as 
causes of post-merger turbulence. 
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Link Key  ideas/findings 
(Alexander et al., 1984; 
Allen et al., 1998; 
Haynes et al., 2002; Hite 
et al., 1983; Kaplan et 
al., 1992; Klein et al., 
1991; Linn et al., 1985; 
Markides, 1992a; 
Montgomery et al., 1984; 
Nanda, 1991; Palepu, 
1990; Rose et al., 2005; 
Schipper et al., 1986; 
Vijh, 2002) 
3 to 8  There is a general consensus about the positive effect that unbundling 
announcements have on the divesting firm’s stock price on the 
announcement date. Boudreaux (1975) and Hearth and Zaima (1984) 
find positive market reactions before, during and after the divestiture 
announcement. Substantial and significant strong positive share price 
variations are normally found on the announcement dates (Haynes et 
al., 2002; Markides, 1992a), sometimes also before (Haynes et al., 
2002; Markides, 1992a; Montgomery et al., 1984) and after it 
(Montgomery et al., 1984). 
(Klein,  1986)  4  to  8  There is a positive relationship between the relative size of the 
divestiture and the announcement day returns: larger sell-offs produce 
larger share day price responses. 
(Palepu, 1990)  3 to 9  - LBOs have 4 main characteristics: high leverage, large management 
ownership, active corporate governance, loss of investors’ access to 
liquid public equity markets. 
- LBOs seem to create value for stockholders through significant 
operating performance improvements, transfers from employees, from 
taxpayers and from pre-buyout debtholders and overpayment by post-
buyout investors.- LBOs have two opposite effects on firm risk: 
they increase leverage associated with financial risks, but changes 
in the organizational structure and strategy reduce business risk. 
Therefore, LBO investors bear lower risk than comparably 
levered investments in public corporations. 
(Palepu, 1990)  3 to 10  - Some pre-buyout bondholders suffer losses at the buyout, but these 
losses account for a very small fraction of the total gains to pre-buyout 
shareholders. 
(Trifts et al., 1990)  6 to 8  - The possible negative effects perceived to exist from the potential 
conflict of interest or from asymmetric information are offset by one 
or more of the positive effects of increased job security and reduced 
agency and servicing costs. 
- Shareholders of both firms share nearly equally in the transaction: the 
transaction’s synergistic effects are not restricted to the selling firm. 
(Woo et al.,  1992)    9  to  8  - Following divestiture, the performance gains of related subsidiaries 
exceed those of unrelated subsidiaries 
 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 might seem to emphasize content issues. For example, researchers 
seem so far to have neglected the links, if there are any, between General Environment (box 
1) and Process stream (boxes 5, 6 and 7), and between Strategic (box 9) and Organization/ 
Governance (box 10) outcomes. Similarly, Industry characteristics (box 2), even if analyzed 
in the “content box” type of research, are not related to any other of the boxes in the diagram. 
Industry characteristics seem to affect only the unbundling decision, but not the process or 
the outcomes. 
 
Corporate characteristics (box 3) and Strategic Outcome (box 9) are connected with 
a bidirectional arrow. The parent, with specific strategic characteristics prior to the 
unbundling, pursues strategic objectives in the divesting operation. The argument follows 
essentially from the studies of Bowman et al. (1999) and  Hitt et al. (1996). Hence, we draw 
a bidirectional link. We were expecting the same reasoning to apply also to other links, such 
as between Economic performance (box 3) and Economic outcome (box 8). However, the 
current literature does not consider any other bidirectional connections than those between 
box 3 and box 9. 
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Boxes in the process stream are not considered to be affected by the antecedents of 
the operation or to participate in influencing its outcomes. 
 
 
Comments on Choice of mode (box 5) 
 
The Choice of mode (box 5) can be included in both “theme oriented” studies and 
“linkage exploring” studies. In this section, we present the findings of the current literature 
on Choice of mode. Within the Antecedents category, most attention is paid to Corporate 
Characteristics (box 3). Within the Outcome category, Choice of mode is linked mostly to 
Economic outcome (box 8). Some authors compare the different unbundling modes, 
portraying their antecedents and outcomes (McGahan et al., 2003a, 2003b; Montgomery et 
al., 1984; Powers, 2001; Slovin et al., 1995). 
 
1.  A parent undergoes a carve-out when it has poor operating performance, high 
leverage, need for external financing and its capital is constrained (Allen et 
al., 1998; Powers, 2001), and when outside investors are likely to price the 
new shares higher than the managers’ perceived value (Slovin et al., 1995). A 
company choosing to engage in a carve-out is releasing information about the 
existence of positive net-present-value projects (Schipper et al., 1986). 
Typically, the parent choosing a carve-out wishes to retain operating 
synergies or benefits of tax consolidation and means to re-acquire the public 
shares (Schipper et al., 1986). Often, the parent knows that the carve-out is an 
intermediate stage for the divested unit before it is divested it into another 
mode (Klein et al., 1991; Slovin et al., 1995). Carve-outs allow a larger set of 
firms to undertake valuable projects, financing new investment opportunities 
separately through the carved-out company (Allen et al., 1998; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Another reason to choose the carve-out mode is to improve the 
asset management structure through new incentive contracts and new 
responsibilities (Schipper et al., 1986). Carved-out units are considered a 
high-value asset (Powers, 2001) and operate in an industry related to other 
parent industries (Powers, 2001). 
 
2.  Firms tend to spin-off a business unit when the resources and competencies of 
the subsidiary are valuable, but managing them is less effective under full 
ownership (Rose et al., 2005). Parents choose a spin-off if they are operating 
in a highly changing and competitive environment (Aron, 1991; Garvin, 
1983; Ito, 1995); if they want to eliminate negative synergies in their 
structure; if they wish to boost entrepreneurial spirit and reduce turnover 
(Garvin, 1983); if, within high technology industries, there are great 
differences in R&D expenditures and intangible assets (John, 1993); and if 
managers believe that the market is mis-valuing the firm in its current 
organizational form (the so called hubris hypothesis, (Linn et al., 1985). In 
general, the spin-off parents are not too diversified and the division to be 
spun-off is a low-value asset (Powers, 2001). Since spin-offs reduce the size 
of the parent manager’s “empire” without a corresponding receipt of cash, 
one might expect incentives for the managers of the divesting parents to be 
more closely aligned with the value-maximizing objectives of shareholders 
(Powers, 2001: p.3). The parent company can use the unbundling operation to 
implement efficient internal governance and control practices in the spun-off 
firm (Seward et al., 1996), to reduce debt or give special dividends to 
shareholders using the proceeds of the sale (Bowman et al., 1999), and to 
reduce agency costs and create tax shields (John, 1993). A spin-off may truly 
be a method for increasing total firm value without any of the complicating 
motives that seem to impact sell-off and carve-out decisions (Powers, 2001: 
p.3). 18 
 
3.  A company engages in a management buy-out, when the divested division 
managers are ready to pay for the unit a higher price than the value perceived 
by the parent, if the parent wants to maximize the cash flow from the sale; 
and when existing managers will continue to run the divested unit efficiently, 
if the parent is interested in its post-divestiture performance (Seth et al., 1993; 
Singh, 1993; Trifts et al., 1990). MBOs often continue to operate significant 
portions of the original assets (Seth et al., 1993). 
 
4.  Parents opt for a complete separation via a sell-off when they do not want to 
maintain a trading relationship (Rose et al., 2005). This occurs when 
subsidiaries have poor operating performance, high leverage, are highly 
diversified, and operate in underperforming industries (Powers, 2001). When 
compared to their parents, sell-off divisions are low-value assets and operate 
in industries different from the other parent industries (Powers, 2001). Parents 
seem to use sell-offs as a way of “taking out the trash” (Powers, 2001: p.3). 
 
To summarize, the decision to choose a sell-off or carve-out depends on three 
factors: the characteristics of the business unit (it is worth selling, it performs well, it is 
related to the parent’s businesses, it is related to the other parent industries); the 
characteristics of the parent (performance, leverage, need for cash, diversification); and the 
characteristics of the environment (pace of growth and performance of industry).  Given a 
need for external finance, the decision to choose a sell-off or carve-out rests on whether the 
parent firm has something worthwhile to sell. Carve-out divisions show a better operating 
performance than their parents and are significantly more profitable and faster growing than 
spin-off divisions, which in turn are more profitable and faster growing than sell-off divisions 
(Powers, 2001). These factors are reflected in the relative selling prices of the various 
divisions: relative to the book value of their assets, carve-out divisions sell for the highest 
price whereas sell-off divisions sell for the lowest price (Powers, 2001). The choice between 




A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH ON CORPORATE UNBUNDLING 
 
From the above analysis it appears that empirical and conceptual research on 
divestiture has investigated some aspects of unbundling more than others. The most recurrent 
research questions in the literature concern the characteristics of divesting firms and the 
effect of unbundling on shareholders’ wealth. 
 
 
Measurement of performance 
 
A divestiture affects the performance of the divested unit and of the divesting parent. 
Variations in the latter are easy to evaluate, while changes in the former, mostly in the case of 
a sell-off, may be more difficult to identify. The total economic effect of unbundling is 
captured by changes in the stock market price of the company or by its operative profit. 
Accordingly, researchers use market performance or accounting performance to measure the 
effect of unbundling. 
 
 
Measures and methods 
 
Analyses of the economic performance of the divesting parent or of the divested unit 
use either market-based measures or accounting-based measures. 
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Market-based measures are used prevalently in event studies. The effects of the 
unbundling announcement are normally measured using Fama’s Cumulative Average 
Residuals (CARs), (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). The estimation period for the 
parameters of the event study methodology goes from 5 years prior to the event 
(Montgomery et al., 1984) to 90 days after the event (Linn et al., 1985), depending on the 
study. It is mostly finance-based papers that use event study and CARs to analyze corporate 
performance (Alexander, Benson, & Kampmeyer, 1984; Allen et al., 1998; Boudreaux, 1975; 
Denning et al., 1990; Hearth et al., 1984; Hite et al., 1983; Klein, 1986; Klein et al., 1991; 
Linn et al., 1985; Markides, 1992a; Miles et al., 1983; Montgomery et al., 1984; Rosenfeld, 
1984; Schipper et al., 1986; Seward et al., 1996; Slovin et al., 1995; Vijh, 2002; Wright & 
Ferris, 1997). Colak and Whited (2004) suggest that positive results of unbundling operations 
may be due to a sample bias (endogeneity bias: firms which decide to divest are different 
from those which decide not to divest) and measurement errors (use of Tobin’s q). 
 
When research uses accounting measures, the study period varies from a few years 
(Woo et al., 1992) to a few days surrounding the event (Hearth et al., 1984). The parent’s ex-
post performance is calculated using return on assets (Bergh, 1995; Berry, 2003; 
Montgomery & Thomas, 1988; Woo et al., 1992), return on equity (Boudreaux, 1975), return 
on capital employed (Haynes et al., 2002), return on sales (Berry, 2003) or inflation-adjusted 
sales growth (Woo et al., 1992), market-to-book ratio (Woo et al., 1992), average stock 
market price and its variations (McGahan et al., 2003a), financial strength as return on equity 
compared to industry average (Alexander et al., 1984; Duhaime et al., 1987), CAPM alpha 
(Berry, 2003; Kaplan & Weisbach, 1992; Woo et al., 1992), liquidity and leverage as current 
ratio (pretax assets/current liabilities), interest coverage (pretax income plus interest expense, 
all divided by interest expense) and debt ratio (Montgomery et al., 1988). 
 
Recent studies increasingly use accounting-based measures. This type of analysis 
complements the broader literature focusing on market-based measures. Only a few studies 
have applied both accounting-based and market-based measures (Boudreaux, 1975; Hearth et 
al., 1984). 
 
Since alternative measures are available, we suggest using an integrative approach 
and relying on multiple measures in future research. 
 
 
Geographic and industry context 
 
Most of the current literature on unbundling does not distinguish between industries 
and sectors, but focuses essentially on large US public companies. 
 
Normally, authors tend to filter companies according to criteria such as public 
ownership, presence on a US exchange or availability of data on public databases and do not 
select companies according to sector or industry. Exceptions are Berry (2003) and Reuer and 
Shen (2004), for the manufacturing sector; Rose and Ito (2005), for the service sector; 
Mitchell (1994), for the medical sector; Gopinath and Becker (2000), for the medical 
products division of a large chemical company; Anand et al. (1997), for the defense-sector 
dependent industries; and Woo et al. (1992) for non-financial firms. Furthermore, only few 
authors integrate these databases with personal interviews and direct contacts with the studied 
companies. 
  
As far as non-US studies are concerned, only Nees (1981), Capron et al. (2001), 
Dahlstrand (1997), Nees (1981), and Makhija (2004) consider European companies; Haynes 
et al. (2002), UK public companies; Wright and Ferris (1997), South African firms; and Ito 




Directions for future research 
 
This paper presents a classificatory framework for understanding why similar 
antecedents of unbundling can produce different outcomes. Although gaps in existing 
literature have been pinpointed in the previous sections of the paper, we synthesize them 
here. These arguments are presented here to stimulate further research and discussion. We 
also discuss the implications of our framework for future theoretical and empirical analysis 
and management practice. 
 
 
Need for process studies 
 
In the proposed framework, the greatest research gap appears to be in the process 
stream. In general, the existing literature prefers to focus on antecedents and outcomes. We 
believe that more research is needed on the process of unbundling and the decision-making 
dynamics. First, research on the unbundling process could distinguish between intended and 
unanticipated outcomes, i.e. not expected in advance by the actors. For example, McKinley 
and Scherer (2000) claim that organizational restructuring has two unanticipated 
consequences. At organizational level, restructuring has the unanticipated consequence of 
producing cognitive order for top executives. At environmental level, restructuring has the 
unanticipated consequence of contributing to the long-term environmental turbulence. 
 
Second, mainly studies focusing on the economic outcome of unbundling have 
neglected variables at the process management level. Studies that focus only on the link between 
corporate characteristics, such as the management team, and economic outcome, for instance, fail 
to explain how the management team or employees’ perceptions, other than on layoffs, affect the 
outcome of the unbundling operation. Factors at process level, rather than simply antecedents, 
may affect the outcome of the unbundling operation and enhance a firm’s competitive position 
and performance. Research including process-level variables could help to determine ex-ante 
whether, in what circumstances and how unbundling operations increase value. 
 
In sum, we believe that researchers now need to begin to address process issues in 
unbundling, for two reasons. First, this analysis can shed light on unbundling in general, 
making managers aware also of the unanticipated consequences of unbundling. Second, the 
link between antecedents and outcomes may be moderated by a sum of other factors at 
process level. 
 
We welcome research run by multidisciplinary teams, using a more complete approach. 
We do not claim that this will bring uniformity and convergence of approaches or results. But, 
from a strategic standpoint, we do claim that the interaction of different perspectives, such as the 
sociological and psychological ones, can possibly provide a richer understanding of unbundling 
operations. This seems particularly important in the analysis of the “process” of unbundling, 
which can only be partially understood if analyzed from one single perspective. The richness of 
this field of research derives mainly from the diversity in tools, approaches and methodologies. 
Such research should entail fine-grained methodologies, such as intensive field research and case 
studies. Finally, these methodologies could also help in understanding how to operationalize the 
various research gaps identified in this paper. 
 
 
Need for studies on long-term effects 
 
Unexplored aspects of the outcomes include the investigation of the long-term 
consequences of unbundling operations, mostly on the divesting parent company
5.  
                                                            
5 Tehranian et al. (1987) and Wright et al. (1994) represent an exception. 21 
 
Unbundling does not have to be a once-in-a-lifetime event, but may be a means for the 
company to continuously adapt to external and internal changes. Analysis of the long-term 
consequences of unbundling could help managers to understand how they can determine ex 
ante whether unbundling will increase their firm’s value and in which divesting modes such 
value is maximized. Linked to this issue is the design of the governance and control 
mechanisms of a divested firm and how it affects the firm’s future. 
 
 
Other areas for future research 
 
Future research could analyze unbundling on different levels. Research could follow 
two directions. First, it could investigate industry characteristics, which have not been related 
to any other analytical variables. Industry characteristics seem to affect only the unbundling 
decision, but not its process and outcomes. Second, it could examine unbundling at country 
level. The institutional context, i.e. a country’s capital, product and labor market, regulatory 
system, and mechanisms to enforce contracts, can affect corporate strategic choices. Future 
research could investigate unbundling operations at European level or distinguish between 
unbundling in emerging and developed countries. In this latter case, conglomerates may 
substitute for institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The idea that units divested from 
conglomerates can create more efficient and focused companies is based on the notion that 
these companies operate in efficient markets (Khanna et al., 1997; Khanna & Palepu, 1999). 
In emerging countries, however, unbundling operations may end up creating more problems 
and destroying value for firms (Makhija, 2004). Khanna and Palepu (1997; 1999) claim that, 
in this context, companies should pursue restructuring operations rather than dismantling 
operations. They suggest reform of business practices and organizational forms, such as 
venture capital and LBOs, that can work as better institutional substitutes, providing the soft 
infrastructure of the Western economies (Khanna et al., 1999). However, nobody has yet 







This paper has provided an overview of research on unbundling from a 
multidisciplinary perspective, but with a particular focus on strategic management research in 
this area. We believe that research on unbundling needs to take a more daring approach that 
deals with process issues instead of continuing to focus essentially on more tractable but 
overemphasized content issues. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to review the existing literature in order to clarify the 
terminology and present a more systematic approach to research on unbundling. We hope 
that our efforts to put forward a set of consistent definitions and specific criteria for 
differentiating operations (from restructuring downwards) and each type of unbundling will 
help to advance in this area. 
 
We have proposed a framework for both clarifying and categorizing existing 
literature. Within this framework, it is easy to identify gaps of analysis. Therefore, we have 
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